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FINDING A HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT:
THE SEARCH FOR A REASONABLE
REASONABLENESS STANDARD
Meri 0. Triades*

I. INTRODUCTION

Sexism and racism are social phenomena that perpetuate the subordination
of women and blacks in American society. Discrimination in the employment
context has traditionally functioned to hinder the equal participation of women
and blacks in the workforce, thus maintaining and exacerbating their inferior
positions in the social hierarchy. When employment or employment benefits
are conditioned upon sexual favors or when an abusive work environment is
created through inappropriate sexual conduct, women are treated as sex objects
and their merit as workers is disregarded. Likewise, when racial hostility
pervades the workplace and racial epithets are subsumed within the daily
vernacular, the injustice to and disadvantage of African Americans workers are
perpetuated. To prevent such egregious practices, federal civil rights law has
made sexual harassment and racial harassment legally cognizable injuries. The
proper inquiry to determine if an actionable hostile work environment claim
has been met is the subject of this paper.
The role of Title VII in sexual and racial harassment litigation is discussed
in Section II. The cases that first recognized and set forth the parameters of
harassment law are introduced and the elements required to state a claim are
briefly discussed. Section III criticizes the traditional application of the
reasonable person test in sexual harassment litigation. The reasonable person
test is applied in a male-biased manner and, thus, preserves the status quo that
tolerates the subordinate position of women in both society and the workplace.
An alternative reasonableness inquiry, the reasonable woman test, is then
introduced. The reasonable woman test demands the application of a genderconscious inquiry into claims of sexual harassment to dismantle the
institutionalized notions ofsexism that allow inappropriate workplace behavior
to go unchecked. Section IV criticizes the reasonable person standard in cases
of racial harassment. The reasonable person test, in this context, is prone to
* J.D. Candidate 2002, Washington and Lee University School of Law; B.A. 1999, Dartmouth
College. The author wishes to thank her parents for their ceaseless encouragement and love; Professor
Louise Halper for her tireless guidance, thoughtful insights and invaluable mentorship; and the editorial
board of the Washington and Lee Race and Ethnic Ancestry Law Journal for its support.
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depict only the traditional white perspective and, thus, ignores the perspective
of minorities who are more susceptible and sensitive to racial discrimination.
A reasonable black person test recognizes that the different social experiences
of minorities and non-minorities are relevant to their perspectives and
reactions to racially harassing conduct. Section V introduces the unique
problem black women face in the workforce. Black women are potentially the
victims of both sexual discrimination and racial discrimination. This dual
vulnerability, however, does not simply mean that the burdens black women
face are double. Rather, the intersection of race and gender in their lives
creates experiences that are both qualitatively and quantitatively different from
either white women or black men. This unique position must be
accommodated in employment law. The introduction of a reasonable black
woman standard and the ability to argue an aggregate sexual/racial harassment
claim is necessary. Finally, Section VI asserts that courts can recognize the
experiential differences of harassment victims within a workable methodology
ofjudging employment discrimination claims.
II. TITLE VII AND THE HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT

Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act makes it an unlawful employment
practice for an employer to "discriminate against any individual with respect
to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because
of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."' Rogers v.
EEOC,2 a Fifth Circuit decision, was the first case to recognize that a racially
hostile work environment, without any accompanying loss or denial of a
tangible job benefit, is an actionable claim under Title VIIV Speaking for the
majority, Judge Goldberg stated that "employees' psychological as well as
economic [well-being] are statutorily entitled to protection from employer
abuse, and that the phrase 'terms, conditions, and privileges of
employment'... is an expansive concept which sweeps within its protective
ambit the practice of creating a working environment heavily charged with
ethnic or racial discrimination." 4
In MeritorSavings Bank v. Vinson, 5 the Supreme Court held that sexual
harassment constitutes sex discrimination in violation of Title VII.6 The Court
recognized two forms of sexual harassment: (1) quidpro quo; and (2) hostile
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(2)(a)(l)(1964).
454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971).
Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971).
Rogers,454 F.2d at 238.
477 U.S. 57 (1986).
Mentor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 73 (1986).
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or abusive work environment.7 Quid pro quo sexual harassment occurs
whenever a supervisor bases any employment decision affecting an individual
on that individual's submission to or rejection of some sexual conduct.' In
order to state an actionable quid pro quo claim, the plaintiff must suffer a
tangible economic loss.9 Hostile work environment harassment occurs when
an individual is subjected to unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual
favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature.' ° The denial
of a tangible job benefit does not necessarily accompany this type of
misconduct." For hostile work environment harassment to be actionable, it
is enough that the harassment is " sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the
conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive working
environment" even in the absence of adverse economic consequences.'"
The Supreme Court has suggested the appropriateness of a single standard
in judging both race-based and sex-based abusive work environment claims.
In Harrisv. Forklift Systems, Inc., 13 the Court discussed in general terms "a
work environment abusive to employees because oftheir race, gender, religion
or national origin" without any indication that a different standard might apply
depending on the protected category at issue.14 Justice Ginsburg's concurrence
in Harrismade the analogy between racial harassment and sexual harassment
even more explicit by importing the standard used in a lower court's decision
regarding a race-based discrimination claim to explicate the proper standard
5
for actionable sexual harassment.'
A plaintiff proves the existence of a hostile work environment when he/she
demonstrates that (1) he/she was subjected to discriminatory intimidation
because of his/her race or sex, (2) the conduct was unwelcome and (3) the
conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive as to alter the terms or conditions
6
of the victim's employment and create an abusive work environment.'
This analysis includes both a subjective and objective inquiry. Not only
must the victim find the conduct unwelcome, but the conduct must also be
''severe or pervasive enough to create an objectively hostile or abusive work
environment - an environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or

7. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65.
8. 477 U.S. at65.
9. Id.at69.

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

Id at 65.
Id.
Id.at 67.
510 U.S. 17 (1993).
Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993).
Harris, 510 U.S. at 25-26.
Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 875-876 (9th Cir. 1991).
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abusive." 7
Thus, the objective component of the analysis requires courts to conduct
a reasonableness inquiry. The courts are in disagreement, however, as to the
proper perspective by which to evaluate allegedly discriminatory conduct.
Somejudges apply the traditional reasonable person standard, while others feel
that a reasonable woman or reasonable African American standard is more
appropriate. Which of these standards (or possibly an alternative standard)
will best effectuate Title VII's goal of removing the obstacles that have
traditionally limited women's and African Americans' access to employment
is a significant and relevant topic of debate. Once it is found that an actionable
hostile work environment exists, the court must then determine whether the
employer is liable for such discriminatory behavior. 8
III. SEXUAL HARASSMENT- REASONABLENESS STANDARDS
A.

The Reasonable Person Standard

The reasonable person is a hypothetical person used as a legal standard to
assess certain conduct. It is most commonly used in tort to determine whether
someone has acted with negligence. The rationale underlying the reasonable
person standard is that by reflecting upon and adhering to the generally
accepted standards of society,judges can make neutral and unbiased decisions.
In theory, the test is gender-neutral.
In practice, however, the reasonable person standard tends to be malebiased. Whenjudges are asked to consider how a reasonable person would act
or react in a certain situation, it is natural for them to refer to their own
intuitions and experiences to inform their judgment. Since judges are

17. Harris,510 U.S. at21.
18. Unfortunately, the issue of employer liability and how it may be affected by the application of
the various reasonableness standards is beyond the scope of this article. It should be briefly noted, however,
that in BurlingtonIndustries Inc. v. Ellerth, the Supreme Court found that an employer could be liable for
the hostile work environment harassment committed by either the victim's supervisors or co-workers.
Burlington Indus. Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 759, 765 (1998). Title VII attaches liability to "employers"
and "employer" liability for actions of its employees is determined by ordinary common law rules of agency
as tempered by the remedial goals of Title VII. Id. at 754. An employer is subject to vicarious liability for
an abusive environment created by a supervisor with higher authority over the plaintiff employee. Id. at
765. However, when no tangible employment action is taken by the supervisory employee, (as is the case
in hostile work environment harassment), the employer can raise an affirmative defense to liability. The
defense is comprised of two elements: (1) that the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and
correct promptly any harassing behavior, and (2) that the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take
advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer. Id When, on the other
hand, the harassment is committed by a co-worker of the plaintiff employee, the employer can be liable on
the theory of negligence if the employer knew or should have known about the harassing conduct and failed
to take prompt measures to stop it. Id at 759.
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predominantly white males,' 9 the potential for the reasonable person standard
to morph into a reasonable man standard is likely. As a result, the experiences
of historically disempowered groups, in this case women, are systematically
ignored. The ramifications of this phenomenon are particularly ironic and
disheartening in the realm of employment discrimination law. Though the
intention of Title VII is to eradicate discrimination in the workplace and
protect the employment opportunities of marginalized groups, a male-biased
reasonable person standard tends to preserve the status quo of a work
environment that favors white males and treats "others" unfairly.
The application of a reasonable person/man standard in hostile work
environment cases (in which the victims are overwhelmingly female) proves
problematic. The proper inquiry in a hostile work environment allegation is
not the intention of the harasser, but how harassment affected the victim.2"
Some might question the capability of a male judge to objectively assess the
effects of harassment from the vantage point of the harassed. Scholars assert
that, overall, judges do not analyze harassment in this manner.2 Rather than
lookingfor the victim's perspective on what conduct she affirmatively accepts
and what conduct is actually harmful to her, judges look at the victim (her
appearance, dress, behavior) to determine the reality of the situation.22 Thus,
the courts have been criticized for judging harassment claims "through the
eyes of the perpetrator. 23
The judicial analyses of many sexual harassment claims support this
criticism. Judges have declared that a woman welcomes sexual harassment
when she fails to confront her harasser or does not report the harassment
immediately after it occurs. 24 The Supreme Court considers provocative
speech or dress to be relevant as to whether the harassment is unwelcome.
The High Court has even sanctioned inquiry into the victim's sexual activity
and sexual fantasies to determine if there was a hostile work environment.26
All these determinations were made under the guise of the reasonable person

19. Excluding the Supreme Court, as of June 2001, 20.6% of federal judges were women. This was
up from only 9.5% in 1997. Furthermore, there is little ethnic diversity in the federal judiciary. Eightythree percent of federal judges are Caucasian.
GenderGap In Government, at
http://www.gendergap.com/governme.htm (last modified June 6,2001).
20. This is different from quidproquo harassment in which the intent of the perpetrator, and not the
effect on the victim, is the legally significant issue.
21. Toni Lester, The Reasonable Woman Test in Sexual HarassmentLaw - Will it Really Make a
Difference?, 26 IND. L. REV. 227, 239 (1993).
22. Id. at 240.
23. Wendy Pollack, Sexual Harassment: Women's Experience vs. Legal Definitions, 13 HARV.
WOMEN'S L.J. 35, 62 (1990).

24. Waltman v. International Paper Co., 875 F.2d 468, 484 (5th Cir. 1989).
25.

Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67.

26. Id at 69.
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standard.
The application of the reasonable person standard has been an injustice to
the female victims of sexual harassment. This is apparent in the Sixth
Circuit's opinion in Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co. 27 In this case, a male
employee routinely referred to female workers as "whores," "cunt," "pussy"
and "tits.,, 28 Of the plaintiff, he remarked, "all that bitch needs is a good lay"
and called her "fat ass."29 Additionally, numerous pornographic posters of
partially nude women were displayed throughout the workplace.3 ° The court
held that these conditions did not constitute a hostile work environment.3'
Even more shocking than the court's decision was its reasoning. Speaking
for the majority, Judge Krupansky articulated the reasonable person test that
the court was to adhere to in its analysis:
In the absence of conduct which would interfere with that hypothetical
reasonable individual's work performance and affect seriously the
psychological well-being ofthat reasonable person under like circumstances,
a plaintiff may not prevail on asserted charges of sexual harassment anchored
in an alleged hostile and/or abusive work environment regardless of whether
the plaintiff was actually offended by the defendant's conduct.32
But rather than determining whether the hypothetical person or society-at-large
would consider the male employee's vulgar and misogynistic language and
pornographic displays sufficiently severe and pervasive, the court instead
focused on weaknesses of the plaintiff's personality as an explanation for the
tension that existed in her workplace. It found that she was "abrasive, rude,
antagonistic, extremely willful, uncooperative" and unable "to work
harmoniously with co-workers." 33 It is ironic that the court also described
Rabidue as "capable, independent [and] ambitious."34 It did not, however,
attempt to reconcile these conflicting characterizations or even consider that
Rabidue's hostility may have resulted from her co-worker's abusive language
and her supervisors' toleration of it.35
The court also found that the pre-existing social attitudes of both the
workplace and society in general were relevant to the reasonableness inquiry.

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986).
Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 624 (6th Cir. 1986).
Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 624.
Id. at 623-624.
Id. at622.

32. Id. at 620.
33. Id. at615.
34.
35.

Id.
Lester, supra note 21, at 241.
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In assessing whether an actionable hostile work environment existed, the
majority asserted that important factors to consider are "the lexicon of
obscenity that pervaded the environment of the workplace both before and
after the plaintiff's introduction into its environs, coupled with the reasonable
expectation of the plaintiff upon voluntarily entering that environment."36
From this statement, the court seems to assert that a woman cannot succeed on
the merits of a sex harassment claim if she assumes the risk of working in a
pre-existing hostile or abusive environment.37 Even worse, the court intimates
that a woman cannot state a hostile work environment claim if she chooses to
live in a society that condones the behavior of which she complains. The
majority concluded that:
The sexually oriented poster displays had a de minimis effect on the
plaintiff's work environment when considered in the context of a society that
condones and publicly features and commercially exploits open displays of
written and pictorial erotica at the newsstands, on prime-time television, at
the cinema, and in other public places.3"
The Rabidue court's analysis is flawed on many levels. Its proposition
that the social context (represented by both the victim's particular workplace
and pop-culture at large) in which the harassment occurs can diminish the
harassing impact of inappropriate behavior is not only ludicrous, but it is
contrary to Title VII and its promise to remove the obstacles that keep women
from participating in the workforce on an equal basis as men. Places of
employment that are characterized by sexually abusive behavior are at the core
of hostile environment theory. A pre-existing atmosphere that deters women
from entering or continuing in a profession is no less destructive of and
offensive to workplace equality than formal exclusion. 39 Furthermore, the
recognition of sexual harassment as a form of sex discrimination, in violation
of Title VII, means exactly that conduct that may be condoned in some settings
can be abusive and intolerable in the workplace.
To state that conditions in the workplace are a reflection of conditions in
society and therefore do not constitute sexual harassment is a Catch-22. For
it is traditional patterns of society (i.e. female subordination) that victimizes
women when it occurs unchecked at the workplace. As Catherine MacKinnon
has stated, "if the pervasiveness of an abuse in society makes it non-actionable,
no inequality sufficiently institutionalized to merit a law against it would be
36.
37.
38.
39.

Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 620.
Lester, supra note 21, at 241.
Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 622.
Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyard, 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1526 (M.D. Fla. 1991).
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actionable." 4'
The reasonable person standard, as applied by the Sixth Circuit in finding
that the pin-up poster displays had only a de minimis effect on the plaintiffs
work environment, is analytically defective. Diminishing the harassing impact
of the pin-ups in light of society's commercialization of sex either
overestimates the public's consensus on pornography or equates the term
"society" with "prurient men" or, according to the dissenting opinion, "the
unenlightened."4' 1 Judge Keith, the sole dissentor in Rabidue, described a
poster, typical of the overall display that the majority had innocuously labeled
as "sexually oriented." '2 It showed a prone nude woman with a golf ball on
her breast and a man standing over her, golf club in hand, yelling "Fore!" 43
Judge Keith considered daily exposures to such images as more 44likely
constituting a shocking assault on the senses than a de minimis effect.
Furthermore, as Professor Kathryn Abrams argues, "the fact that many
forms of objectionable speech and conduct are protected against interference
by public authorities in the world at large does not mean that pornography
should be accepted as appropriate in the workplace." '5 Pornography in the
workplace is more threatening to women than it is to the public at large.46 In
the public realm, pornography can be largely avoided.47 In a confined workspace where pin-ups are plastered all over the walls of common areas, this may
not be a possibility. Additionally, the message a pornographic image takes on
differs depending upon the context in which it is viewed. Publicly
disseminated pornography remains the expression of the editors of nudie
magazines and the directors of skin-flicks.48 On the walls of an office, it
becomes the expression of a co-worker or boss as well.49 The depiction of
women in these images, that of sex object to be acted upon, is in sharp
opposition to the manner in which most women want to be viewed in the
workplace.5"

40. CATHERINE A. MAcKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 115 (1987).

41. Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 627.
42. Id. at 624 (Keith, J., dissenting).
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Kathryn Abrams, GenderDiscrimination andthe Transformation of WorkplaceNorms, 42 VAN.
L. REv. 1183, 1212 (1989).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
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B. The Reasonable Woman Test

It should come as no surprise that because of the respective positions men
and women occupy within the power structure of society, their experiences
with and reactions to sexual harassment are likely to differ markedly. Some
scholars argue that these differing perceptions need to be acknowledged and
that the distinct perspective women hold should be incorporated into the
reasonableness inquiry of hostile environment cases.
The Ninth Circuit approved of this position in Ellison v. Brady5 when it
held that a female plaintiff states a prima facie case of hostile environment
sexual harassment when she alleges conduct that a reasonable woman would
consider sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of employment
and create an abusive work environment.52 The court adopted this new
standard upon its recognition that the theoretically sex-blind reasonable person
standard is inclined to be male-biased." A gender-conscious examination of
harassment claims, the majority argued, will not establish greater protection
for women than men but will be more efficient in enabling the sexes to
participate equally in the workforce. 4
Acknowledging that viewpoints among women diverge, the Ninth Circuit
still asserted its belief that women, as a group, share certain common concerns
and experiences which set them apart from men in their attitudes towards
sexual harassment.55 As the majority noted, women are disproportionately the
victims of rape and sexual assault. Thus, while men, who are generally not the
victims of such crimes, can view sexual harassment in a vacuum, women have
a reasonable basis from which to fear that any sexual conduct may be a prelude
56
to sexual violence.
The Ellison court also justified its gender-conscious analysis as necessary
to dismantle the prevalent notions of sexism that have been absorbed into and
become "normal" aspects of employment environments. The reasonable
woman standard is consistent with the goals of Title VII because it undermines
and challenges those accepted but faulty notions of "reasonable" behavior.
The court stated:
Congress did not enact Title VII to codify prevailing sexist prejudices. To
the contrary, Congress designed Title VII to prevent the perpetuation of
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991).
Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 879 (9th Cir. 1991).
Ellison, 924 F.2d at 879.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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stereotypes and a sense of degradation which serve to close or discourage
employment opportunities for women ... When employers and employees

internalize that standard of workplace conduct we establish today, the current
gap in perception between the sexes will be bridged."
The advantages of the reasonable woman standard are obvious. It
responds to the fact that over the course of the development of our legal justice
system, the reasonable person standard has become infused with the male
viewpoint."8 Furthermore, it exposes the false neutrality and universality that
has become characteristic of judicial analyses and that, more often than not,
work to the detriment of minority and underrepresented groups.
There are also, however, some potentially significant shortfalls to the
reasonable woman test. To begin with, the new standard may prove to be
entirely ineffective within a judiciary that remains (for all intents and
purposes) an old boys' club. Regardless of what standard they apply, male
judges still have the same experiential and intuitive deficiencies that hinder
them from understanding why or how a woman objects to sexual harassment.5 9
In other types of litigation where judges lack the direct knowledge to analyze
the reasonableness of a party's actions (for example, in a medical malpractice
case), they rely upon expert testimony to inform their judgments. The courts
remain, however, extremely reluctant to admit expert testimony as to the
reasonableness of a woman's action, as has been demonstrated by the
controversy surrounding the Battered Women's Syndrome defense.6 °
Furthermore, even if judges acknowledge that men and women perceive
harassment differently, there is the danger that they will ascribe the differences
to biology. Ascribing the differences between the sexes to nature is likely to
stigmatize women rather than promote equality. Kathryn Abrams warns that
this could result in the courts attributing women's perception of sexual conduct
in the workplace to a natural proclivity for modesty and chastity rather than as
a consequence of longstanding discrimination in the workplace and the high
incidence of sexual violence targeted at women. 6'
Another disadvantage to the reasonable woman theory, articulated by
some feminist scholars, is that it falsely generalizes about women. Abrams
cites the public debate surrounding the Thomas-Hill hearings as supporting the
proposition that women do not think about sexual harassment in the same
57. Id. at 881.
58. Kathryn Abrams, Social Construction,Roving Biologism, and Reasonable Women: A Response
to Professor Epstein, 41 DEPAUL L. REv. 1021, 1034 (1992).
59. Id. at 1033.
60. Id. at 1034.
61. Id. at 1034-35.
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way.6 2 Relying on anecdotal evidence, Abrams found that working-class
women had less sympathy for Anita Hill than professional women. 63 Having
themselves navigated through coercive working environments, these women
faulted Professor Hill for not doing the same.'
Abrams contends that
individual attitudes towards sexual conduct in the workplace are shaped by
one's personal sense of security in the workforce as well as the construction
of one's own sexuality. 65 These factors are likely to vary notjust between men
and women, but also among women.
It should be noted, however, that the former criticism of the reasonable
woman standard is just a smaller-scale version of the problem created by the
reasonable person standard. While the reasonable woman standard may overgeneralize about the perspectives of women, the reasonable person standard
over-generalizes about the perspectives of people - usually equating those
perspectives with white male viewpoints. Therefore, although the reasonable
woman standard may be vulnerable to challenges, it nonetheless comes closer
to redressing and rectifying the unique obstacles hindering women in the
workforce than does the existing reasonable person standard.
Angela Harris has criticized the feminist theory of gender essentialism
because it permits a small group of women - white, middle-class women to describe their own perceptions and experiences and claim them as the
norm. 66 As a result, she contends, the voices of poor, black and lesbian women
are largely ignored and their experiences are acknowledged as differing only
in degree and not quality. 67

In the realm of employment law, gender

essentialism may cause the reasonable woman standard to transform into a
reasonable, white, heterosexual, middle-class, professional woman standard.
The reasonable woman test will be of meager value if it fails to address the
perceptions and experiences of the majority of women in the workforce.
C. Salvagingthe Reasonable Woman Standard
The ineffectiveness of the reasonable person test in recognizing and
punishing sexual harassment necessitates an alternative standard. Although
the reasonable woman test may not be the perfect solution, it will be a more
effective tool in dismantling the sexism that has become institutionalized

62. Id. at 1036.

63. Id.
64.

Id.

65. Id.
66. Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialismin Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REv. 581, 585
(1990).
67. Id. at 596.
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within the American workforce. However, in order to avoid the problem of
attributing to nature the differences between the sexes and over-generalizing
the experiences of women, a structured and consistent methodology of how to
apply the reasonable woman standard must be generated. A method that takes
the dynamics of socialization and the social construction of gender into
account is needed.
In Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards,68 the Middle District of Florida
implemented a promising method by which to apply a new reasonable woman
standard.69 Robinson concerned the grievance of Lois Robinson, one of the
few female skilled craftworkers employed at the Jacksonville Shipyards.70
Robinson sued for sexual harassment on the basis of a hostile work
environment after being subjected to particularly egregious harassing conduct.
She was called "honey," "baby," "sugar," and "momma"by her co-workers
and was subjected to vile comments such as "hey pussycat, come here and give
me a whiff," and "the more you lick it, the harder it gets."'" Additionally,
Robinson's workplace was bombarded with extremely graphic and explicit
pornography.72 On occasion, Robinson's male co-workers would wave these
pictures in front of her or place them in her personal workspace to upset her.73
Abusive graffiti, including such comments as "eat me," and "lick me you
whore dog bitch" were written over Robinson's locker.74 The court recognized
that the shipyard's environment was extremely hostile to women and awarded
a judgment in favor of the plaintiff.75
In enunciating the reasonableness inquiry, the court considered the sex of
the victim a significant consideration: "The objective standard asks whether
a reasonable person of Robinson's sex, that is, a reasonable woman, would
perceive that an abusive working environment has been created." 76 This
standard is not dissimilar from that articulated in Ellison. The court here,
however, further emphasized that, at least in sexual harassment cases, the
reasonable person test must take sex into account.
To determine whether a reasonable woman would consider the working
68. 760 F. Supp. 1486.
69. Robinson, 760 F. Supp. at 1486.
70. The shipyards' annual report of 1986 indicated that, at the time, there were six women and 846
men who worked as skilled craftworkers at the company. Id.at 1493.
71. Id. at1498.
72. Id. at 1495-96. The court described the content of some of these images in its findings of fact.
Two typically offensive images included one of a nude black woman, pubic area exposed to reveal her labia,
seen in the public locker room, and the other, a picture of a woman's pubic area with a meat spatula pressed
on it, observed on a wall next to the sheetmetal shop. Id.at 1495.
73. Id.at 1495-1496.
74. dat 1499.
75. Id. at 1539.
76. Id.at 1524.
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environment of the shipyards abusive, the court turned to the testimony of two
experts: Dr. Susan Fiske and K.C. Wagner. Dr. Fiske testified on the subject
of sexual stereotyping and its manifestation at the Jacksonville shipyards.77
She defined sexual stereotyping as a process of perceiving people as divided
into groups, maximizing the differences among groups and minimizing the
differences within groups.78 This categorization leads to an in-group/out-group
phenomenon and can produce discriminatory results in employment settings
when a person in that job setting judges another person based on some "group"
quality unrelated to job performance.79 Thus, when a female employee is
evaluated in terms of characteristics that comport with stereotypes assigned to
women, she may be evaluated poorly if she does not conform to those
stereotypes regardless of how competently she performs her job.8"
Fiske identified four preconditions that tend to encourage stereotyping in
the workplace: (1) rarity, when an individual's group is small in number in
comparison to its contrasting group; (2) priming, the process in which specific
stimuli in the work environment prime certain categories for the application
of stereotypical thinking; (3) the nature of the power structure in the
workplace; and (4) the ambience of the work environment. 8 Fiske found the
shipyards to be rife with sexual stereotyping. She described it as a "sex role
spillover, where the evaluation of women employees by their coworkers and
supervisors [took] place in terms of the sexuality of the women and their worth
as sex objects rather than their merit as craft workers. 8 2 Fiske found that the
nude photographs and sexual slurs were stimuli that encouraged a significant
portion of the men at the shipyards to view and interact with their female
coworkers as if those women were sex objects.83 Furthermore, she pointed out
that the group affected by the sexualized work environment were women and
those who decided how to handle their grievances were men.14 The ingroup/out-group phenomenon diminished the impact of the women's
concerns.85 Supervisors tolerated unprofessional conduct that promoted the
stereotyping of women in terms of their status as sex objects.86
K.C. Wagner testified as to common patterns and responses to sexual

77. Id. at 1502-1505.
78.

Id. at 1502.
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80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
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Id.
Id.
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harassment.87 She explained that how women respond to sexual harassment
can differ depending on the woman's individual personality, the type of
incident and the woman's expectation as to whether the situation will be
resolved. 8 Typical coping methods include: (1) denying the impact of the
event and blocking it out; (2) avoiding the workplace harasser; (3) confronting
the harasser; (4) engaging in joking or other banter in the language of the
workplace to defuse the situation; and (5) making a formal complaint.8 9
According to Wagner, victims of harassment rarely make formal complaints
because they fear that it will cause the problem to escalate or the harasser to
retaliate. 90 As for the effects of harassment, Wagner cited studies conducted
by the American Psychiatric Association to articulate the documented
emotional and physical stress victims of harassment often suffer. 9' She also
relied on her own experiences and survey research to explain how men and
women perceive harassment differently. She found that male co-workers
often fail to see harassment in their own behavior because they falsely believe
that only supervisors can contribute to a hostile work environment.92
Furthermore, she found that the higher a person is in the managerial chain of
command, the more likely he is to regard sexual harassment as an exaggerated
problem.93
The court concluded that the expert testimony provided a reliable basis
upon which to conclude that the cumulative and corrosive effects of the
shipyard environment would affect the psychological well-being of a
reasonable woman placed in those conditions." 94 The deference the court gave
to the testimony of Dr. Fiske and Ms. Wagner in assessing the hostility of the
work environment is significant. By relying on expert testimony, the court
seemed to acknowledge that it lacked the requisite knowledge, experience and
intuition by which to independently determine whether a hostile work
environment existed. Thus, it implemented the reasonable person/woman test
in a manner similar to the courts' application of the reasonable person test in
cases where expert testimony is required.
As exemplified by the Robinson case, the introduction of expert testimony
in sexual harassment cases should become standard practice. Continued
empirical work and documentation on the cause and effect of hostile work
environment harassment would encourage the judiciary to more freely admit
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id. at 1505-1507.
Id. at 1506.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1524.
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expert testimony. Indeed, the Supreme Court has acknowledged the
appropriateness of such testimony. In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,95 the
Supreme Court relied on the testimony of Dr. Fiske to conclude that sex
stereotyping is a form of sex discrimination."
Although the Supreme Court has not explicitly sanctioned a genderconscious reasonableness inquiry, an inquiry of this nature is appropriate, as
sexual harassment is a gender-conscious offense. Sexual harassment, when
ignored and even condoned, perpetuates the inequities of a patriarchal society.
It relegates women to a subordinate position, labels them sex objects,
disregards their merit as workers and is, therefore, disruptive and potentially
psychologically damaging. Since sexual harassment is an offense that is made
possible by traditional patterns of socialization, the reasonableness inquiry
must recognize the placement of the victim of harassment within the power
structure of society. Therefore, expert testimony needs to assess and examine
the social context in which harassment exists, as well as the relegated role of
the victim in society.
The presentation of expert testimony should become a standard practice
in sexual harassment cases and should be utilized regardless of whether the
presiding judge is a man or a woman. Although a female judge may have a
more intuitive understanding of the deleterious and injurious effects of
workplace harassment on the advancement of women, expert testimony
should, nonetheless, be relied upon to inform the considerations of both judge
and jury. Regular use of expert testimony will better educate the public about
the widespread problem of sexual harassment and its undermining effect on
female workers, thereby making greater strides to alter (or correct) social
norms. Furthermore, an adjudication that requires an objective inquiry will be
resolved in a more just and equitable manner if the final judgment is grounded
in quantitative and qualitative evidence based on fact rather than on an
individual judge's personal characterization of an alleged offense.97
In establishing the framework from which to implement the
reasonableness inquiry, the experts must articulate the variation in experiences
and perspectives between and among men and women. When appropriate,
these characterizations should be linked to the relevant social construction that
generates the differences. In doing so, the experts need not banish all traces
of biological influences. Where biology is a justifiable factor, it can be
95. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
96. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228,251 (1989).
97. Although the use of expert testimony has been advocated for in this article as a method of
transcending personal biases, the implementation of the reasonable woman standard is not limited to the use
of expert testimony alone. For example, the reasonable woman standard may also entail the use of jury
instructions.
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acknowledged. However, where biology is influenced or amplified by social
constructs, explanatory testimony must be provided. 98 Furthermore, the
differences among women must be explored and assessed. As pointed out
earlier, people's attitude towards sexual harassment is shaped by their sense
of security in the workplace and the construction of their own sexuality.99
These factors differ among women and are likely to be influenced by the race,
ethnicity, religion, and/or sexual orientation of the woman. These factors must
be incorporated within the reasonableness inquiry.
The reasonable person/woman test advocated in this paper requires both
the consideration of the commonalities between women and the source of
differences among women. As a result, the inquiry is susceptible to both an
over-generalization and an over-particularization ofthe experiences of women.
There are tactics by which to mitigate the effects of either phenomenon. The
body of information collected regarding the differences among women should
be used as the factual base from which to draw generalizations about
women. 00 Although this does not completely avoid the problem of
essentialism, it is likely to diminish the disparities of power.' 0 '
The
generalizations agreed upon will reflect a range of experiences of women, and
not just the experiences of a small, privileged group of women.0 2
Since it will be impossible to account for all the differences among women
in constructing a reasonable woman standard, another approach that is
recommended by some feminist scholars is simply to make a categorical,
normative choice about how to characterize women for litigation purposes.0 3
Furthermore, dismantling the societal preconceptions that perpetuate the
existence of sexual harassment need not only take place within the context of
litigation. The most effective solution may be to implement policies and
practices within companies to sensitize employees to the nature and effects of
harassment. Toni Lester recommends that companies address sexual
harassment by promulgating a policy statement that explicitly describes
examples of harassment, penalties that will be applied to offenders and the
grievance procedure available to victims.'
Additionally, educational
programs that rely on narrative strategies and expose male employees to
women's accounts of their experiences of sexual harassment might produce
greater flexibility and sensitivity by highlighting the variety of women's
98. Abrams, supra note 58, at 1038.
99. See supranote 66 and accompanying text.
100. Abrams, supra note 58, at 1038.
101. Id. at 1039.
102. Id.
103. Id. See also Martha Chamallas, Feminist Constructionsof Objectivity: Multiple Perspectives in
Sexual and Racial HarassmentLitigation, 1 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 95 (1992).
104. Lester, supranote 21, at 261-262.
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perceptions and experiences."'
Even though the reasonableness standard argued for in this paper has been
labeled the "reasonable woman test," it is, in some sense, a correct application
of a reasonable person or reasonable victim standard. These latter tests advise
the courts to judge a situation or event in light of the "totality of the
circumstances." For the inquiry to be fully probative, the circumstances of the
victim must be included within the totality. Therefore, if the victim is a
woman, this fact should be incorporated into the reasonable person/victim
inquiry. It may, however, be preferable as a matter of semantics, to maintain
the label "reasonable woman standard" in the realm of hostile work
environment harassment. It acknowledges the fact and reminds the court that
the victims of harassment are overwhelmingly women and that in the
hierarchical structure of society, women have not achieved parity. As a result,
it will force (male) judges to make a more probing inquiry and thus avoid
decisions influenced by their personal biases.
The reasonableness inquiry argued for here is not inconsistent with the
existing precedent regarding hostile work environment harassment. In Harris
v. ForkliftSystems, 1°6 the Supreme Court held that the reasonableness inquiry
in hostile work environment harassment requires both a subjective and
objective examination. °7 The subjective standard is satisfied if the victim of
the harassment subjectively perceives the conduct to be abusive.' I8 The
objective standard is satisfied if the environment is one that a reasonable
person would find hostile or abusive."° The Court explains that the only way
to determine if a hostile environment exists is by looking at all the
circumstances, which "may include the frequency of the discriminatory
conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a
mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an
employee's work performance.""'
This is not at exhaustive list. It can
accommodate the reasonable woman standard introduced here. Furthermore,
incorporating the reasonable woman standard will clarify and add certainty to
the reasonable person standard enunciated in Harris that Justice Scalia
criticized as "vague" and "add[ing] little certitude."' '

105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
Ill.

Abrams, supra note 58, at 1039.
510 U.S. 17(1993).
Harris v. Forklift Sys. Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21-22 (1993).
Harris, 510 U.S. at 21-22.
Jd.at21.
Id. at 23.
Id. at 24 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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REASONABLENESS STANDARDS

The Reasonable Person Standard

As in cases premised on sexual harassment, judges dealing with racial
harassment have also been confronted with the task of choosing the
appropriate reasonableness inquiry to inform their analyses. Courts must
decide whether the existence of an abusive work environment should be
objectively judged from the perspective of a race-blind reasonable person or
a race-conscious reasonable person. The race-blind reasonable person
standard has been criticized as representing only the majoritarian view. 112
Sarah McLean asserts that ways of looking at what is and what is not
reasonable inevitably derive from the point of view of those who dominate
law-making in a given society." 3 Therefore, it should come as no surprise that
the reasonable person test as applied to cases of racial harassment is prone to
accommodate the white male viewpoint, leaving the perspectives of minorities
unrecognized and ignored.
Scholars, however, contend that when assessing sufficient levels of
harassment, the question of perspective is vital in recognizing the distinct
experiences of black and white Americans and in effectuating the goals of
employment discrimination law." 4 It is argued that differences in the
perspectives of minorities and non-minorities stem from their differences in
experience."' Those who have long-suffered the indignities of racial animus
are likely to view incidents of discriminatory conduct differently than those
who have never been victims of racial bias." 6
The choice of perspective is also related to the goal sought to be achieved.
If the aim of Title VII is to protect prevailing workplace norms and make
unlawful only that conduct that all persons (both black and white) find
offensive, then a race-neutral test is the appropriate standard." 7 Alternatively,
if the goal of employment discrimination law is to challenge prevailing
workplace norms by revealing that conduct considered common or trivial to
some is actually profoundly harmful to others, then a race-conscious test

112. Tam B. Tran, Title VII Hostile Work Environment: A Different Perspective,9 J. CONTEMP.
LEGAL ISSUES 357, 368 (1998).
113. Sarah McLean, Harassmentin the Workplace: When Will the Reactions ofEthnic Minoritiesand
Women be ConsideredReasonable?, 40 WASHBURN L.J. 593,599 (2001).
114. Tran,supranote 112, at368.
115. McLean, supra note 113, at 608.
116. Tran, supra note 112, at 368.
117. L. Camille Herbert, Analogizing Race and Sex Workplace Harassment, 58 OHIo ST. L.J. 819,
858 (1997).
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should be employed." 8 As will be demonstrated below, the choice of
perspective is often outcome-determinative.
Courts that have employed the race-neutral reasonableness standard have
trivialized the experiences of African Americans, thus producing inequitable
and unjust results. In Davis v. Monsanto Chemical Co.,' two African
American males brought a hostile work environment claim in response to
considerably severe discriminatory conduct at the factory for which they
worked. 2 ' The evidence cited by the plaintiffs in support of their allegation
of a discriminatory environment was considerable.'
Racially offensive
22
graffiti was scribbled on the restroom walls.' A training poster depicting the
plight of an inept worker was shaded to represent a black person and labeled
with plaintiff Davis' name."23 A co-worker spit on and partially erased Davis'
time card.'24 Racial epithets were commonly used in conversations and white
employees refused to eat lunch with black employees and refused to shower
in the stalls that black workers used.' 25 Despite the seeming severity of this
conduct, the court concluded that it did not rise to the level of actionable racial
harassment.' 26
Relying on Rabidue,'27 the court explained that offensive terms and posters
do not make out a Title VII claim if they merely reflect the pre-existing
attitudes of the factory workers.'28 Speaking for the majority, Judge Cohn
stated that "it is not the function of the courts to pass upon the morality or
appropriateness of conduct in the workplace but only to assess whether the
proofs establish an environment of conduct that rises to a level that meets the
standards of the statute."'' 29 The court then concluded that the alleged racial
graffiti and insulting poster fell "squarely within the holding of Rabidue,
where offensive language and posters were found in a factory environment not
' 30
to constitute a violation of Title VII.'
Similarly, the court flippantly dispatched the allegation that the workers'
expressed and manifested personal racial biases constituted an abusive work

118.

Id.
119. 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15759 (E.D. Mich. 1987).
120. Davis v. Monsanto Chem. Co., No. 85-LU-74031, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15759, *2 (E.D. Mich.
May 6, 1987).
121. Davis, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15759 at *10- 14.
122. Id. at*10.
123. Id. at *I1.
124. Id. at*12.
125. Id. at*13.
126. Id. at*14.
127. Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 624.
128. Davis, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15759, at *9.
129. Id. at *9 -*10.
130. Id. at *11.
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environment. It found it significant that the racial slurs used by the workers
were "part of the workaday world of the factory"' 13' and never directly
addressed to the plaintiffs. 132 Furthermore, as in Rabidue, the court reasoned
that the plaintiffs assumed the risk of working in a pre-existing hostile
environment because they had been warned of the biases exhibited by older
white workers when they were originally hired. 33 Judge Cohn explained that
"the reasonable expectation of plaintiffs upon voluntarily entering that
134
environment must further detract from the gravity of the case they describe."'
Not even the patently racist refusal to shower in stalls blacks had used
persuaded the court otherwise.' 35 "The elimination of 'Archie Bunker' types
from the factory environment carries Title VII too far" 136appears to
summarize the majority opinion.
The Davis court's analysis and reasoning is vulnerable to the same line of
criticism expressed against the Rabidue decision in the previous section. In
rejecting the racial harassment claim on the grounds that bigoted "Archie
Bunker"-esque attitudes already existed at the factory upon plaintiffs' hiring
is to turn Title VII and, indeed, the entire Civil Rights Act on its head. It is
one thing to concede that the personal "opinions" of individuals are beyond the
scope of Title VII. To extend this same protection to the manifestations of
"opinions" in the form of verbally expressed racial hatred and practices of
segregation in the workplace is simply preposterous. This type of anti-social
behavior has an extremely intimidating effect that serves to limit the
employment opportunities of African Americans, thus preventing their
achievement of equality. It is exactly this scenario that Title VII seeks to
remedy.
In Vaughn v. Pool Offshore Co.,'37 the Fifth Circuit found that rampant
harassment aboard an oil rig resulted not from an environment polluted with
racial discrimination, but from an "atmosphere replete with instances of
humiliating acts shared by all."' 3 8 Vaughn, an African American male, was a
roustabout working and living on an oil rig in close-quarters with eleven other
men.' 39 He brought an abusive work environment claim against his employer
based on allegations that he was referred to as "nigger," "coon" and

131.
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134.
135.
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139.

Id. at *9.
Id. at*13.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
683 F.2d 922 (5th Cir. 1982).
Vaughn v. Pool Offshore Co., 683 F.2d 922, 924 (5th Cir. 1982).
Vaughn, 683 F.2d at 923.

Finding a Hostile Work Environment

2002]

"blackboy,"' 140 was doused with ammonia while showering, had hot coffee
poured into his back pocket, and that, during a hazing ritual, he was stripped
down naked and had his genitals greased with oil. 41 A toolshed on the rig had
"KKK headquarters" written across its fagade. 14 2 Furthermore, in response to
a news report about a black man that had shot several people in New Orleans,
a crew member on the rig stated, "that's just like a nigger; give him a gun and
he shoots anything that moves."' 43
In ruling that the elements of actionable racial harassment had not been
met, the Fifth Circuit assumed a boys-will-be-boys attitude. It cited with
approval the district court's conclusion that "hazing and practical joking
should be viewed realistically as male interaction and not atypical of the work
environment involved."'' 44 Since the genital-greasing hazing was frequently
accorded to new offshore rig workers, the court characterized it as a "seeming
rite of passage" and not racially motivated.'45 Neither was the court persuaded
by the fact that the pranks and practical jokes directed at Vaughn were often
accompanied by racially derogatory remarks. 146 The court found that
Vaughn's own use of racial slurs and the crew members' "expressed amicable
feelings towards Vaughn" negated a characterization of the rig environment
47
as dangerously charged with racial discrimination.
In rejecting the existence of harassment based in part on the plaintiff's use
of racial slurs, the Vaughn court teeters too close to the regrettable practice in
sexual harassment cases of blaming the victim. In hostile work environment
claims based on sex, court decisions often turn on whether or not the victim
"welcomed" or "incited" the harassing conduct. This line of reasoning is as
misguided in the race context as it is in the context of sex. To reiterate, in the
Robinson case, expert witness K.C. Wagner explained that women react to
sexual harassment in a variety of ways, including to respond to the harasser
with jokes or banter of a similar sexual nature in order to defuse the situation.
The Vaughn court, however, fails to consider the possibility that the plaintiff's
use of racially-charged language may have been for a similar purpose. The
court's opinion does not explain the nature of or the context within which the
plaintiffs alleged racial slurs were made. It does not specify to whom the
comments were targeted and it completely ignores the possibility that
plaintiff's racial remarks may have been provoked by the admittedly frequent
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
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racially derogatory conduct aimed at him.14 8 These considerations would have
been relevant in judging the claim. The element of "welcomeness" has
traditionally been absent from judicial inquiries of actionable racial
harassment.1 49 It would be a grave misfortune for the Vaughn decision to
legitimize the notion that minority group members are responsible for the
harassing conduct directed towards them.
B. Reasonable Black PersonStandard
Americans share a common historical and cultural heritage in which
racism has played and still plays a dominant role. 5 ' The economic survival
of the American colonies was contingent upon human bondage, and Africans
and later African Americans were brutalized in the slave trade. Following
emancipation, lynching and the terrorism of the Ku Klux Klan were imposed
on black communities to maintain white power and superiority. Statesanctioned segregation continued to perpetuate the denial to black americans
of their constitutionally granted political and social rights and further
exacerbated the racial divide. Even if modem society can recognize and
admit that its nation's history is contaminated by its legacy of racism, it is still
undeniable that this history has influenced the collective consciousness and
psyche of black society in a fundamentally different way than that of white
society.
As the two cases in the preceding section demonstrate, the reasonable
person standard, which encompasses the viewpoint of the white male, is a
gravely inadequate standard by which to judge the perceptions and experiences
of racial minorities. African Americans often fear that racial slurs or jokes
can develop into more dangerous and threatening racially motivated
conduct.' 5 ' This fear is warranted and understandable given the history of
violence targeted at Black Americans. 152 Meanwhile, racially motivated
comments and conduct commonly go unnoticed by non-target group
members."' A great disparity exists between those who have suffered racial
prejudice and those who have not experienced discrimination and are,
therefore, less likely to recognize its damaging nature.' 54 A race-conscious test
- the reasonable black person or reasonable African American standard 148. Herbert, Supra note 117, at 819, n. 127.
149. Id. at 850.
150. McLean, supra note 113, at 608.
151.

Id. at607.

152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Tran, supra note 112.
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considers these differences in experience and the perceptions that can be drawn
from them.
Courts that have employed the reasonable black person standard have
more successfully addressed the often unique perspective of African
Americans and given greater force to the purpose of Title VII - to eradicate
discrimination in the workplace and protect the employment opportunities of
marginalized groups. In Harrisv. InternationalPaper Co.,15 the plaintiffs
alleging a hostile work environment were three black male mill workers who
were transferred from the defendant's paper mill in Mobile, Alabama to its
56
mill in Jay, Maine, following a strike by the unionized Maine mill workers.
The discrimination suffered by the plaintiffs upon entering their new place of
work included verbal, visual and physical abuse.5 5 The plaintiffs were
invariably addressed as "lazy nigger,' ' l.. "black ass,"' 59 "black son of a
bitch," ' "Buckwheat,"'' "barbecue,"' 62 "watermelon man,"'63 and "porch
monkey."'" Co-workers complained about the plaintiffs' work in racial
terms 6"' 5 and made comments about the stereotyped food preferences of black
people."' White workers who were friendly to the plaintiffs were labeled
"nigger lovers."' 67 Racially offensive graffiti also abounded. "KKK"
appeared on a steel support. 6 Other racist graffiti, such as "Buckwheat,"' 6 9
"black sucks"170 and "nigger go back south" was written in the bathrooms used
by both workers and supervisors. ' 7 1 Plaintiff Minor was given a mock express
ticket to Africa containing a derogatory characterization of a spear-carrying
155. 765 F. Supp. 1509(D. Me. 1991).
156. Harris v. Int'l Paper Co., 765 F. Supp. 1509, 1516 (D. Me. 1991). Although the plaintiffs sued
under the Maine Human Rights Act (MHRA), the court noted that the MHRA is the state analogue to Title
VII and that federal anti-discrimination precedent would guide its analysis. Id. at 1511-12.
157. Harris,765 F. Supp. at 1516-1521.
158. 765 F. Supp. at 1517.
159. Id. at 1518.
160. Id. at 1517.
161. Id. at 1518.
162. Id. at 1519.
163. Id. at 1518.
164. Id. at 1519.
165. Id. at 1517.
166. Id. at 1519-1520. The following are examples of other racist comments or "jokes" to which the
plaintiffs were exposed:
"What's the hardest thing on a black man? The third grade."
"What did God say when he made the first black man? Oh, I burned one."
"How do you find a black person? You have to see if they smile."
"Why do black people keep their children inside? They don't want the cat to bury the kids in
the yard because they are the color of shit." Id. at n. 25.
167. Id. at 1520.
168. Id. at 1518.
169. Id. at 1519.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 1518.
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black man. 72 The plaintiffs were also confronted with more overtly
threatening behavior.
On more than one occasion, their work was
sabotaged. 73 Two co-workers dressed in white suits and white hats,
"pranc[ed]" around Plaintiff Harris at his workstation.' 74 Another co-worker
donned a white cone-shaped hat and attempted to push plaintiff Pugh toward
a repulping machine.'75 Even more shocking, a co-worker yelled "you
fucking nigger" at plaintiff Minor, picked up a sledge hammer and grabbed
him around the neck. 76 On another occasion, this same co-worker again
yelled "you fucking nigger" at Minor and pushed him on the catwalk between
a pulper (comprised
of steel blades) and a calendar stack (made up of steel
77
pressing rolls).
The court found for the plaintiffs. 178 Relying on Title VII jurisprudence,
Judge Carter articulated the well-settled principle that for racial harassment to
be actionable, it must be sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions
of the victim's employment and create an abusive environment. 79 In
implementing this analysis, the court relied on a reasonable black person
standard.'
It stated that "[t]o give full force to [the] basic premise of
antidiscrimination law ... the standard for assessing the unwelcomeness and
pervasiveness of conduct and speech must be founded on a fair concern for the
different social experiences.. .of white Americans and black Americans.''
The court relied on and quoted from a significant body of scholarly works in
discussing the different manners blacks and whites respond to racial
harassment.' 82 It pointed to the existence of a society ingrained with cultural
and race-based stereotypes as the source of negative racial attitudes in
America. 8 3 The results of these often unconsciously held racial prejudices, the
court argued, are racial incidents that blacks interpret as manifestations of
intense racism or preludes to violence that whites consider to be nothing more
than isolated and non-threatening pranks." "Even an inadvertent racial slight
unnoticed either by its white speaker or white bystanders will reverberate in
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the memory of its black victim," Judge Carter noted. 85 Finally, the court
concluded that since the concern of Title VII is to redress the effect of conduct
and speech on their victims, "the fact finder must walk a mile in the victim's
186
shoes to understand those effects and how they should be remedied."'
In Williams v. New York City Housing Authority,'8 7 the Southern District
of New York also applied a reasonable black person standard in upholding a
claim of hostile work environment harassment.' Although the United States
Supreme Court stated that a single racist epithet will rarely meet the requisite
standard of unwelcomeness and pervasiveness,8I 9 the Williams Court found
that the single act of prominently suspending a hangman's noose in the
workplace was sufficiently severe to constitute a claim. 9 The court referred
to sociological studies, statistical studies and scholarly articles to inform its
discussion on the significance of the hangman's noose to black culture. It
explained that after the abolition of slavery, lynchings were employed by
whites to reaffirm their mastery over blacks and to prevent blacks from
expanding beyond the established contours of their subordination.' 9' The
hangman's noose, the court asserted, is the most repugnant of all racist
symbols because it is itself an instrument of violence. 92 In order to fully
appreciate its intimidatory impact on the black viewer, the hangman's noose
must be understood within the context of this country's legacy of violence
against African Americans.' 93 The court further stated:
The hangman's noose remains a potent and threatening symbol for African
Americans, in part because the grim specter of racially motivated violence
continues to manifest itself in present day hate crimes. Moreover, persistent
inequality in this country resuscitates for modem African Americans many
of the same insecurities felt years ago. It is for this reason that the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 was enacted. The courts have a responsibility to be
vigilant in enforcing the provisions of this Act to facilitate the eradication of
obstacles9 4that currently prevent African Americans from achieving
equality.

The implementation of a reasonable black person inquiry, as demonstrated
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by the courts in the District of Maine and Southern District of New York,
acknowledges the experiential differences of different racial groups and makes
real progress in the struggle for racial equality. Verbal abuse, physical
intimidation and fear-provoking use of symbols were found to be egregious
acts.
The reasonable black person standard is, however, vulnerable to attack.
Potential criticisms will fall into the same pattern as those targeted at the
reasonable woman standard. It could be argued that the experiential and
intuitive deficiencies of white judges will prevent them from "standing in the
shoes" of a black victim in analyzing the severity of racial harassment.
However, in reality this "deficiency," unlike in the context of sexual
harassment, may actually be a benefit because it will enhance judges'
objectivity. It is likely that the white judge presiding over a racial
discrimination case, with his privileged lifestyle and private-school education,
has never come into meaningful contact with members of the black
community. On the other hand, he has interacted with women every day of
his life. The white male judge is less likely to identify with the racial harasser
than the sexual harasser and, therefore, is less likely to find a need to justify
the harassing conduct.
There is also the risk that the reasonable black person's perspective could
be used in a repressive way to blame the victim for failing to adopt the "white"
interpretation of behavior.'95 This danger, however, would be mitigated by
the appropriate application of the reasonable black person standard by
decisionmakers sensitive to the special experiences of minorities with respect
to workplace harassment.'
As previously discussed in reference to the
reasonable woman standard, the use of expert testimony could be paramount
in this regard. This practice was evidently employed in the Harris and
Williams decisions with great success. Both opinions frequently cited
scholarly works and statistical and sociological studies to inform their analyses
and buttress their conclusions.
Another potential problem is that the reasonable black person standard will
falsely essentialize the experience and perceptions of African Americans. It
has already been discussed how the reasonable woman standard, as presently
applied, ignores the experiences of black women. That the reasonable black
person standard is vulnerable to the same criticism is the subject of the next
section of this article.

195. Martha Chamallas, Feminist Construction of Objectivity: Multiple Perspectives in Sexual and
Racial Harassment Litigation, I TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 95, 123 (1992).
196. Herbert, supra note 117, at 859.
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V. A SPECIAL PROBLEM: WHAT Do You Do WHEN THE PLAINTIFF IS
A BLACK WOMAN?

A. DiscriminationTargeted at Black Women
Black women are not only vulnerable to race discrimination and sex
discrimination, but are susceptible to a combination of both. The two forms
of discrimination, however, do not combine merely quantitatively to make the
burdens of black women twice as severe as those suffered by white women or
black men. It would be misleading to assert that black women share the same
experiences as white women with only an additional burden of belonging to
a racial minority. Likewise, black women do not simply suffer the same
obstacles as black men with the added hindrance of belonging to the more
vulnerable gender. Rather, the sex and race discrimination targeted at black
women work in tandem to create a level of discrimination that is both
quantitatively and qualitatively different and exponentially more severe in its
degree of harm than that suffered by either white women or black men. 7 This
unique form of discrimination suffered by black women stems from, at least
in part, a unique history of racial and sexual abuse as well as from the
continued existence of negative stereotypes created and perpetuated by a white
patriarchy to maintain its dominance and perceived superiority in a changing
society.
During slavery, the sexual abuse of black women by their white male
owners was rampant. Indeed, the rape of slave-women was an institutionalized
aspect of slavery that was essential to its continuation. 8 The forced sexual
access to black women was justified and rationalized by the myth that black
women were sexually voracious and indiscriminate. 199 It was a commonly
held belief that black women copulated with animals. 00 Consistent with the
myth of black women's rampant promiscuity, both white men and white
women accused black women of inviting the sexual and physical abuses they
suffered.20 '
The stereotypes that justified the sexual abuse of black women in the past

197. Kimberle Crenshaw, Gender, Race, and the Politics of Supreme Court Appointments: The
Import of the Anita Hill/ClarenceThomas Hearings:Race, Gender, and Sexual Harassment,65 S. CAL. L.
REv. 1467, 1468 (1992).
198. Id. at 1469.
199. Id.
200. Id. Crenshaw states that it was common belief that black women would and did have sex with
apes and monkeys.
201. Judith A. Winston, Mirror,Mirroron the Wall. Title VII, Section 1981, and the Intersection of
Race and Genderin the Civil Rights Act of 1990, 79 CAL. L. REV. 775, 785 (1991).
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remain an influential force in current society.2 °2 Kimberle Crenshaw argues
that the continuing myth of black female promiscuity has influenced how
black women are treated in the workplace by their co-workers and supervisors,
in the legal system by judges and jurors, and in popular culture by
screenwriters and directors.20 3 Crenshaw points out that in sexual harassment
cases in which black women are plaintiffs, conduct directed toward them often
represents a merging of racist myths with their vulnerability as women.2l
Insults that are sometimes directed at any woman, such as "cunt" or "beaver"
are prefaced with "nigger" or "jungle" when the victim of the harassment is
black. 2 5 Thus, the sexual harassment becomes racialized or, conversely, the
racial harassment becomes sexualized.
In the judicial context, Crenshaw argues, the stereotypes of black women
influence the perceived credibility of black female plaintiffs and the
objectionability of crimes targeted against them.20 6 Historically, in our legal
system, there was considered to be a direct relationship between veracity and
chastity. 7 The commonly believed notion of black female promiscuity,
therefore, led to the presumption that black women were not likely to testify
truthfully. 2°8 This skepticism as to the integrity of the black female plaintiff
and/or witness, Crenshaw asserts, remains a commonly held attitude. 0 9
Crenshaw goes on to argue that even when black female plaintiffs are believed,
myths about their sexuality influence whether the injury they suffered is
considered relevant.210 She points to studies that reveal that assailants who
attack black women are less likely to receive jail time than those who assault
white women.2 11 Furthermore, when black women's assailants are jailed, the
average sentence is two years, while the average sentence for white women's
assailants is ten years. 2 2 These findings suggest that criminal behavior
directed at black women is considered less objectionable than that directed at
white women.

202. Crenshaw, supra note 197, at 1469.
203. Id. at 1469-1471.
204. Id. at 1469.

205. Id.
206. Id. at 1470.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id. In asserting that the credibility of black women is still questioned in present society,
Crenshaw relies on a study of jurors in rape trials which revealed that black rape victims are often
discredited by jurors. She quotes the comment of one juror: "You can't believe everything they [black
women] say; they're known to exaggerate the truth."
210. Id.
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Crenshaw also points to media representations of black women as a source
of the perpetuation of negative stereotypes.213 The black female prostitute is
'
a stock character in any "gritty, 'realistic,' urban scene."214
Crenshaw asserts
that while movie portrayals of black men as criminals and white women as sex
objects have been criticized as perpetuating racism and sexism, the portrayal
of black women as "sexual deviants - a combination of the criminal and the
sexual," has not been the subject of a similar critical debate.215
The negative association of black women with prostitution and its
portrayal to the public is not, however, limited to the greedy world of moviemaking - it is also manifested in the supposedly enlightened world of
scholarship and academia. Washington and Lee University holds a mock
convention every four years in which student delegates attempt to predict the
presidential nominee of the political party currently out of the White House.
The festivities include speeches by politicians, a presidential gala and a grand
parade in which student delegates representing the various states ride through
town in decorated floats. As part of the 2000 Mock Republican Convention,
a t-shirt logo designed for the Idaho delegation featured a derogatory
depiction of a scantily-clad black woman accompanied by the phrase "I Da
Ho." The university administration responded to the Idaho logo in an
appropriately indignant fashion by compelling the resignation of the part-time
coach who oversaw its production. Nonetheless, it remains shocking and
embarrassing that this blatantly racist and sexist depiction of a black woman
was designed, approved, ordered and worn by members of the Idaho
delegation until fellow university students protested its display.
As the above discussion demonstrates, racial and sexual oppression and
negative stereotyping of black women result in forms of racial and sexual
discrimination that are unique to black women. The color of a black woman's
skin is a factor in how or why she is sexualized. Conversely, the victim's
gender, as well, may be a factor that shapes the form of the racially offensive
conduct directed against her. 216 The intersection of race and gender defines the
experience of the black woman as fundamentally different than that of the
white woman or black man. In the realm of discrimination, specifically
workplace harassment, the intersectional experience is greater than the sum of
racism and sexism. The judicial analysis used in hostile work environment
cases, however, fails to take this intersectionality into account and, therefore,
fails to address the particular manner in which black women are subordinated.
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B. JudicialTreatment of DiscriminationBased on Race andSex
In mostjurisdictions, the law characterizes workplace harassment as either
entirely race-based or gender-based, but not a combination of both. Therefore,
when a black female plaintiff brings a Title VII claim, she must decide whether
to sue under either race or sex discrimination." 7 Crenshaw describes this
decision as putting black women between "rocks and hard places" - between
racism and sexism - because it requires them to deny one dimension of their
reality that is intricately tied to another. t8 Working women who are racial
minorities are discriminated against precisely because they are women of
color. The either/or approach of judicial analysis forces these victims to
separate aspects of their identity that cannot, in fact, be separated. The rocks
and hard places that prevent black women from fully articulating their
experiences, according to Crenshaw, however, are not simply racism and
sexism, but also the "oppositional politics of mainstream feminism and
antiracism."21 9 She asserts that "[b]ecause each movement focuses on gender
or race exclusive of the other, issues reflecting the intersections of race and
gender are alien to both movements. Consequently, although Black women
are formally constituents of both, their intersectional interests are addressed by
neither. '' 20
Likewise, since the reasonable woman standard adopted by some courts
is a product of mainstream feminism and the reasonable black person standard
arose from the advocacy of mainstream anti-racism groups, both of these
standards are also vulnerable to the criticism that they fail to accommodate the
intersectional aspects of racism and sexism experienced by black women. This
intersection, however, will not be accounted for simply by promulgating a
reasonable black woman standard (though such a standard, indeed, should be
adopted).
In order to fully appreciate and recognize the combined form of race and
sex discrimination targeted at black women there needs to be a hybrid
harassment claim that does not consider racism exclusive of sexism or vice
versa. Under this proposed solution, a black female plaintiff can prevail
without fully satisfying the elements of either a traditional racial harassment
claim or sexual harassment claim. She prevails if she alleges incidents that
rise to an actionable level of a compound form of race and sex discrimination.
217. She may also sue under both race and sex discrimination, but must establish the elements ofeach
discrimination separately in order to prevail on both claims.
218. Crenshaw, supra note 197, at 1468.
219. Id.
220. Id.

2002]

Findinga Hostile Work Environment

The pervasiveness and severity of this combined discrimination must then be
viewed in light of the intersectional aspect of race and gender and, therefore,
from the perspective of a reasonable black woman.
The proposal to allow black female plaintiffs to bring a hybrid claim of
race and sex discrimination has met with mixed results in the courts. The
221
opinion in DeGraffenreid v. General Motors Assembly Division
demonstrates that some courts refuse to recognize that the discrimination black
women suffer emanates from the intersection of racism and sexism.222 In
DeGraffenreid,five black female plaintiffs brought a disparate treatment claim
against GM, alleging that its seniority system perpetuated the past effects of
discrimination against black women.223 As a result of not hiring black women
before the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, all of GM's black female
employees hired after 1970 lost their jobs in a seniority-based layoff during an
economic downturn.224 Speaking for the majority, Judge Wangelin refused to
allow the plaintiffs to bring the claim specifically on behalf of black women.22 5
The court stated:
The plaintiffs allege that they are suing on behalf of black women, and that
therefore this lawsuit attempts to combine two causes of action into a new
special sub-category, mainly a combination of racial and sex-based
discrimination. The plaintiffs are clearly entitled to a remedy if they have
been discriminated against. However, they should not be allowed to combine
statutory remedies to create a new 'super-remedy' which would give them
relief beyond what the drafters of relevant statutes intended.226
The court then analyzed the lawsuit to determine whether it stated a cause
for either sex or race discrimination. Based on the fact that women (albeit,
white women) were hired by GM before the enactment of Title VII in 1964,
the court dismissed the claim of sex discrimination.227 The court also made
reference to a consent decree between GM and the EEOC entered into in 1973
with respect to the hiring of female employees as a further indication that the
employment practices of GM did not discriminate on the basis of sex.228
221. 413 F. Supp. 142 (E.D. Mo. 1976).
222. DeGraffenreid v. General Motors Assembly Div., 413 F. Supp. 142,142 (E.D. Mo. 1976).
223. Id. at 143.
224. Id. at 145.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 144.
228. Id. Alternatively, one might consider the need for a consent decree to be fairly conclusive
evidence that there had been a practice of discriminating based on sex at GM before 1973. If the consent
decree had in fact prompted GM to incorporate more women (black and white) into its labor force it still
would not save black female employees from the last-hired first-fired policy since it was not entered into
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Following the rejection of the sex discrimination claim, the court turned
to consider whether the lawsuit alleged a claim for discrimination based on
race.229 The court found that the plaintiffs did indeed state a claim with
regards to racial discrimination, but it dismissed the claim without prejudice.23 °
To serve the "goal of judicial economy," Judge Wangelin suggested that
plaintiffs consolidate their action with another lawsuit pending at the time that
raised broad allegations of racial discrimination against GM employment
" ' The court
facilities.23
remained unconvinced by the plaintiffs' argument that
the consolidation of the cases would defeat the purpose of their suit which was
premised on a combination of race and sex discrimination and not on racial
discrimination alone.232 The court reasoned:
The legislative history surrounding Title VII does not indicate that the goal
of the statute was to create a new classification of "black women" who would
have greater standing than, for example, a black male. The prospect of the
creation of new classes of protected minorities, governed only by the
mathematical principles of permutation and combination, clearly raises the
prospect of opening the hackneyed Pandora's box.233

This statement implies that when enacting Title VII, Congress either did
not contemplate that black women would be discriminated against as "black
women" or that it did not intend to protect them when such discrimination
occurred.234 Thus, the DeGraffenreid court's refusal to acknowledge the
intersection of racism and sexism, despite the obvious disparate impact of the
last-hired first-fired policy on GM's black female workers, indicates that
sexual discrimination is defined solely by the experiences of white women and
that racial discrimination is confined to the experiences of black men.235
Under this view, black women can only expect protection from discrimination
to the extent that their experiences coincide with that of either group.236
Other courts, however, have allowed the aggregation of racial and sexual
discrimination claims. In Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co.,237 a black female
until 1973.
229. Id. at 144-145.
230. Id. at 145.
231. Id. at 144-145.
232. Id. at 145.
233. Id.
234. Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist
CritiqueofAntidiscrimination Doctrine,Feminist Theory and AntiracistPolitics, 1989 U. CriI. LEGAL. F.
139, 142 (1989).
235. Id. at 143.
236. Id.
237. 833 F.2d 1406(10th Cir. 1987).

2002]

Findinga Hostile Work Environment

security guard brought a hostile work environment claim against her
employer."' Incidents of racial harassment alleged by Hicks included her
supervisor directing a comment at her regarding "lazy niggers and Mexicans"
and his general
practice of referring to African Americans as "niggers" and
'
"coons."239
Another security guard referred to Hicks as "buffalo butt. '24 ° The
sexual harassment suffered by Hicks was more physical in nature. On one
occasion a supervisor rubbed her thigh.2 4' On another, a different supervisor
touched her buttocks and said, "I'm going to get you yet. 242 A separate
incident, perpetrated by this same supervisor, occurred when he243grabbed
Hicks' breasts, causing her to fall over, and he "got on top of her.,
The district court rejected Hicks' racial -harassment claim due to
insufficient proof of inappropriate racial conduct and denied the sexual
harassment claim on the basis that the element of quidproquo harassment did
not exist. 244 On appeal, the Tenth Circuit upheld the rejection of the racial
harassment claim.245 Speaking for the majority, Chief Judge Holloway stated
that to establish a hostile work environment claim based on race, the plaintiff
must allege more than a few isolated incidents of racial animus.24 The
evidence of racial hostility introduced by Hicks could not be characterized as
a steady barrage of objectionable comments but as merely occasional and
incidental.247
The Tenth Circuit did, however, remand the sexual harassment claim for
reconsideration. It criticized the lower court. for assuming that Hicks had to
demonstrate quid pro quo harassment in order to state a claim of
discrimination based on sex, and instructed the district court to analyze the
"unwarranted touching... and familiarities" to which Hicks was subjected in
the context of a hostile work environment claim.2 4' Furthermore, the Court of
Appeals also directed the District Court to consider the racial slurs used in the
workplace and targeted at Hicks in its determination of whether there was a
sufficiently pervasive discriminatory atmosphere.24 9 Judge Hollowayjustified
this instruction by explaining that harassment does not have to be sexual in

238.
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nature to be considered sexual harassment."' The court asserted that "[a]ny
harassment or other unequal treatment of an employee or group of employees
that would not occur but for the sex of the employee or employees may, if
sufficiently patterned or pervasive, comprise an illegal condition of
employment under Title VI.""'
Although the Hicks court did not explicitly recognize a hybrid
sexual/racial harassment claim, it did allow the plaintiff on remand to buttress
her claim of hostile work environment harassment based on sex with the
incidents of racial discrimination she suffered. Why the court decided to frame
the incidents of racial harassment within a sex discrimination claim rather than
including the sexual harassment in a race discrimination claim is not clear.
Indeed, the presumption that such sexual versus racial harassment can be so
easily demarcated is itself problematic. In this vein, Judith Winston criticizes
the Tenth Circuit for its inability to conceive of race as being a primary or
equal basis for the hostility directed towards a black woman when the
manifestation of that hostility appears sexual in nature.252 Just because the
most severe incidents of harassment directed at Hicks were sexual this does
not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the discrimination she suffered was
based on sex. It is just as plausible that Hicks was chosen as the target of such
inappropriate conduct because of her race. More likely still, she was
victimized precisely because she was both black and a woman. Under the
Hicks approach, however, the black female plaintiff is limited to phrasing her
complaint as a gender-based Title VII action. 5 3
A more desirable approach was introduced by the Fifth Circuit in Jefferies
v. HarrisCounty Community Action Ass 'n.254 In Jefferies, the black female
plaintiff brought a disparate treatment claim based on race and sex against her
employer for failing to promote her.255 The plaintiff was originally hired as
secretary to the director of programs and later promoted to personnel
interviewer.256 She applied for several promotions to various positions but was
always unsuccessful.257 Every position she applied for was filled by either a
man or a non-black female. 8
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The District Court addressed Jefferies' claims separately.259 It found that
no race discrimination existed because one of the employees promoted to a
position Jefferies sought was a black man. 26" The District Court also dismissed
the sex discrimination claim.26 1 It found the evidence that sixteen out of thirtysix supervisory positions at the agency were held by women clearly
demonstrated that the defendant did not discriminate based on sex in hiring or
promoting decisions.262
The Court of Appeals arrived at a different outcome. Speaking for the
majority, Judge Randall criticized the district court for failing to address
Jefferies' claim of discrimination based on a combination of race and sex and
held that discrimination against black females can exist even in the absence of
discrimination against black men or white women. 263 The court explicitly
recognized black females as a "distinct, protected subgroup" for the purposes
of Title VII. 264 It found support for its holding in the actual statutory language
and legislative history of Title VII. 265 The court explained that Title VII
provides a remedy to employees who are discriminated against on the basis of
their "race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 266 Judge Randall focused
on the use of the word "or" as evidence of Congress' intent to prohibit
267
employment discrimination based on any or all of the listed characteristics.
The court also referred to the legislative history of the Act to bolster its
argument.268 It noted that the House of Representatives' refusal to adopt an
amendment which would have added the word "solely" to modify the word
"sex" is further evidence that Congress did not intend to restrict the application
of multiple characteristics. 269 The Fifth Circuit's most persuasive argument
in support of its holding, however, seems to be grounded in simple common
sense:
Black females represent a significant percentage of the active or potentially
active labor force. In the absence of a clear expression by Congress that it
did not intend to provide protection against discrimination directed especially
toward black women as a class separate and distinct from the class of women

and the class of blacks, we cannot condone a result which leaves black
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women without a viable Title VII remedy. If both black men and white
women are considered to be within the same protected class as black females
for purposes of [Title VII], no remedy will exist for discrimination which is
directed only toward black females.270
The Jefferies court thus recognized the intersection of race and gender
discrimination as a distinct and separate cause of action available to black
female plaintiffs.2"' By identifying black women as a discrete class requiring
a synthesized consideration of both race and sex discrimination, the Fifth
Circuit has come the closest to applying the reasonable black woman standard,
thereby appreciating and responding to the unique experiences and
perspectives of African American women.
C. Advantages and Disadvantagesof the Reasonable Black Woman
Standardand the HybridDiscriminationClaim
The implementation of the reasonable black woman standard and the
hybrid claim of race and sex discrimination in the context of employment
discrimination law recognizes the intersection of race and gender in the lives
of minority females and will effectively redress forms of discrimination that
have been practiced unchecked and unpunished for far too long. The
acknowledgment of the intersectional aspects of black women's identities will
not only redress the prejudice targeted at black women by the white majority,
it will also reveal and redress the intra-racial discrimination suffered by black
women at the hands of black men.
Kimberle Crenshaw presents a revealing discussion of how the sexual
stereotypes and myths of black women have been incorporated into the black
male psyche and therefore used as ajustification for inappropriate and abusive
behavior that occurs within the black community.272 As an example, Crenshaw
refers to a statement made by Orlando Patterson, a well-respected black male
Harvard Professor, during the aftermath of the Clarence Thomas
confirmation.273 Professor Patterson argued that even if the testimony about
Thomas's pornography-laden harassment was true, he was justified in lying
about it because such conduct was acceptable to (reasonable) black women as
merely a form of "down home courting." 274 Crenshaw finds this statement
by Patterson to be "enlightening," not only because it reveals that a shared
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
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racial identity does not make black men more sensitive to the false stereotypes
of black female sexuality, but that it also might explain why harassers of both
races treat women differently on the basis of race.275 Crenshaw explains:
[W]hite harassers may believe that certain behavior is acceptable to Black
women because "they" are different, while Black harassers may believe that
certain behavior is acceptable because "we" are different.276
What is most troubling to Crenshaw about the Patterson statement is that it
manipulates and subverts the axiom of "cultural difference" to validate the
hostile and abusive workplace harassment of black women when it is
perpetrated by members of the same race.277
The hybrid claim, with its acknowledgement of the intersection of race and
gender, will challenge the reliance on this purported "cultural difference" as
a justification for inappropriate conduct perpetrated by men of any race.
Discussions of false stereotypes and their origins will dispel the myth of black
female promiscuity and make strides in guaranteeing that African American
women are accorded greater dignity by all.
The contention that instances of alleged employment discrimination
should be viewed from the unique perspective of black women (when the
plaintiff is an African American female) has been the subject of some
criticism. Mary Ann Weiss criticizes this standard as effectively eliminating
the objective component of the workplace harassment analysis because it takes
the personal dimensions of the victim into account. 278 Taken to the extreme,
if every distinctive characteristic of the victim is considered, the standard will
become completely individualized. 279 This criticism is without merit because
the application of the reasonable black woman standard will be limited to
analyses of race and gender- not every distinctive characteristic an individual
can lay claim to. Furthermore, the standard will represent only a consensus
view of the race and gender group, articulated and explained by experts, to
which the plaintiff belongs. The standard will not take into account the
individualized characteristics of the plaintiff. As discussed in the context of
the reasonable woman and reasonable black person standards, a structured and
consistent methodology to apply the reasonable black woman standard can
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also be achieved through the use of expert testimony and empirical research.
Another criticism is that the reasonable black woman standard will
perpetuate the stereotypes of women and minorities.28 ° The contention is made
that such a standard will require courts to formulate and adopt certain "norms"
about black women which will ultimately just maintain existing racial and
" ' This criticism is unwarranted
sexual oppression.28
because the underlying
purpose of the reasonable black woman standard and the adoption of the
hybrid discrimination claim is exactly to articulate and dispel the myths and
negative stereotypes of black women. Furthermore, over time, as more black
women bring hybrid claims, judges and juries will gain a better understanding
of the sources of negative stereotypes that hinder black women. They will also
become more familiar with the intersectional association of race and gender
and ultimately reject the stereotypical "norms" that have hindered the
advancement of minority women.282
VI. CONCLUSION

This article has argued for the specific adoption of three reasonableness
standards to be used in the analysis of Title VII hostile work environment
claims: (1) the reasonable woman standard; (2) the reasonable black person
standard; and (3) the reasonable black woman standard. In the context of the
reasonable black woman standard, this article has also argued for the adoption
of a hybrid discrimination claim that accounts for the combination of racial
and sexual hostility experienced by black women. The reasonableness
inquiries and forms of hybrid discrimination actions used in Title VII analyses
need not, however, be limited to the specific recommendations set forth in this
paper. The unique perspectives of other groups should also be incorporated
into reasonable victim inquiries. So too, should the intersectional aspects of
certain characteristics be considered relevant when analyzing the employment
discrimination claims of other protected minorities. For example, in some
circumstances a reasonable Black Muslim standard may be appropriate.
Accompanying this inquiry should be an analysis of the intersection of race
and religion and the unique experiences of and perceptions about Black
Muslims in America. Along this vein, a similar analysis may be appropriate
for Arab Muslims. This is especially true in light of recent world events that
have had the most unfortunate result of inciting baseless hostilities towards a
280. Robert Unikel, "Reasonable" Doubts: A Critique of the Reasonable Woman Standard in
American Jurisprudence,87 Nw. U. L. REv. 326, 366-370 (1992).
281. Zelesne, supranote 279, at 880.
282. Tran, supranote 216, at 380.
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segment of the American population that coincidentally shares a common
ethnic and religious background with a few violent zealots.
A skeptic may criticize this recommendation as opening the "hackneyed
Pandora's box." 283 Surely, the argument goes, it will be impossible to account
for all the different characteristics and experiences of American citizens in a
comprehensible and systematic way. Indeed, if there were no limit to the types
of characteristics that could be considered in an employment discrimination
analysis, this criticism would be perfectly sound. There is, however, a limit,
and it is explicitly provided for by the statutory language of Title VII. The
only immutable characteristics that can be incorporated into a reasonable
victim standard and hybrid harassment claim are those protected categories
specifically named in Title VII: race, color, religion, sex and national origin.
One still might argue that a purely neutral reasonable person standard will
be easier to understand and apply and will better maintain the distinction
between the objective and subjective inquiries required in a hostile work
environment analysis. This is only true to the extent that there is such a thing
as a purely reasonable person standard; or that there is such a thing as
objectivity. Whether or not such a neutral reasonableness standard and purely
objective inquiry exist, they have certainly not been discovered by the
American judiciary. Rather, as this paper has demonstrated, what is
considered "reasonable" or "objective" is simply what coincides with the
majoritarian point of view. And as long as a white patriarchy continues in
power, the perspective of white men will be privileged as "objective
reasonableness." Once, therefore, it is acknowledged that no reasonableness
standard will ever be truly objective and the existence of a slight bias in an
objective reasonableness inquiry is inevitable, a valuejudgment must be made
as to whom the bias should favor - those who are least likely to need the
protection of antidiscrimination laws or those who are most likely to require
such protection. Title VII was not enacted to maintain the supremacy of white
men in the social hierarchy. Its purpose is to redress the injustices that have
been perpetrated against underrepresented minorities in this country by the
white majority. Therefore, reasonableness standards that incorporate the
characteristics of race, color, religion, sex and national origin into employment
discrimination analyses are fundamental to the purpose of Title VII and to the
ultimate goal of achieving equality.
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